think there are. 1disagree. The main purpose of this paper is to explain why. In the course of doing so I touch on some important general consid erations concerning the nature of belief and the attribution and specification of intentional content.
One thing which is not at issue between the Russellian and myself is that when someone believes something of an (external) object -that it has a certain property or satisfies a certain condition -then he is in a (narrow) mental state which could exist without the object and without his standing in the relation to the object which makes that state a belief about it.1 The dispute between us concerns the issue of whether such a mental state, which I shall refer to as a 'Z-statc', would be a belief even if the object did not exist. I say it would. My opponent says that under cer tain conditions it would not. In Section I I briefly and sympathetically rehearse what I take to be the most impressive arguments for his position. In Section II I give the basic arguments for mine. Although these argu-mcnts arcfairly obvious, Ithink they arc sufficiently impressive to suggest that thecase for Russellian Thoughts must beflawed. InSection III, which completes the paper, I offer an account of what is wrong with it.
The foundation of thecase for Russellian Thoughts is the claim that there are 'demonstrative beliefs' and, with them, 'demonstrative Z-statcs' which are not reducible to non-demonstrative beliefs and Z-states.
Roughly, a demonstrative belief is (i) a belief which ismostperspicuously expressed by a sentence involving a true demonstrative such as 'this' or 'that' (with or without a qualifying common noun or common noun phrase), and (ii) a belief which itself involves non-descriptive perceptual (or perception-based) reference to the object it is about, or would be about if the objectexisted. (This qualification is necessary to avoid begging the question in favor of Russellian Thoughts.) The demonstrative term in a sentential utterance expressing a demonstrative belief would of course denote the object, if any, which the belief isabout. It wouldlalso express the perceptual reference involved in the Z-state. I will refer to the feature of a demonstrative Z-state which isthevehicle of thisperceptual reference as a 'demonstrative idea'. The precise nature of demonstrative ideas is not our present concern. What we must grant is that every demonstrative Z-statc, whether or not it is a belief, involves at least one demonstrative idea.3 In this paper 1do not consider the arguments for and against demon strative Z-statcs and beliefs, but simply assume with the Russellian that they exist. The main burden of the paper is to show that even if they do exist there isstill good reason to reject Russellian Thoughts. But let us first look at what I take to be the two main arguments in favor of them.
The first of these arguments is that, if there is no object corresponding to a demonstrative idea involved in a Z-state, then that Z-state cannot be attributed to the agent concerned by means of a belief sentence of the form 'x believes that P' or \\ believes of y that P\ Suppose, e.g., that Fred is in his garden on a moonlit nightand has a visual experiencewhich causes (and perhaps in part constitutes) a Z-statc in him which he would natu rally express by the utterance
That is a frog. 4 In view of my decision to accept in this paper that there arc irreducible demonstrative beliefs, I shall not dispute this argument here. There is nonetheless a possibility which goes against it, viz., that having a demonstrative belief about an object is nothing more than having a perceptual existential belief which is caused in an appropriate way by a state of affairs in which that object is essentially involved. Such an account, which I find attractive, is strongly suggested by the treatment of object perception in my 'Perceptual
The second main argument for Russellian Thoughts aims to establish that thecontent ofa demonstrative belief depends crucially on there being an object it is about, in the sense that if there were no object the relevant Z-statc would have no content. In that case it would not be a belief. So when it is a belief, it is a Russellian Thought.
The detailed argument relics on the assumption that a mental state can not have the content necessary to qualify as a belief without having truth conditions. Abelief, after all, represents a stateof affairs as obtaining, and given the state of affairs it represents, its truth conditions are fixed (and vice versa) . But now consider a Z-state involving a demonstrative idea, e.g., that with which I have saddled Fred. Docs this Z-statc represent a state of affairs, and does it have truth conditions? In the situation in which Fred's demonstrative idea applies to an object in the world, it is clear enough that the state of affairs represented is the one in which that very object isa frog. Thus Fred's Z-statc is true iff thatvery object isa frog, and false iffit is not a frog. Tims his Z-statc hasthecontentnecessary to qual it represents, and that a demonstrative idea without an object therefore has no content and so cannot figure in a genuine belief.
It is worth remarking here that the above two arguments for Russellian
Thoughts are connected by the following important principle concerning belief attribution and belief content:
(B) In general, \\ believes that P' is true only if x has a belief which is true iff IV This is meant to hold even if 'P' contains 'de re' terms such as indexicals.
Thus, e.g., (B) implies the following:
'Pete believes that I am short' is true only if Pete has a belief which is true iff I am short.
As far as it goes, this is surely correct. In general terms, (B) says that any oratio obliqua belief sentence is true only if the agent referred to is in a state with suitably specifiable truth-conditional content. Thus if an agent is in a state without suitably specifiable truth-conditional content (as the second argument claims Fred to be when his demonstrative idea has no object), then there is no true oratioobliquabelief sentence corresponding to it (which is what the first argument claims of Fred's Z-state when the object is missing).
II
In this section I present my basic case against Russellian Thoughts with out reference to the details of the above arguments for them. I do, how ever, assume that if there are any Russellian Thoughts about external objects, then demonstrative beliefs arc Russellian. I therefore concentrate on trying to establish the opposing claim that a Z-state involving a demonstrative idea is a belief even if that idea has no object. Firstly, 1want to stress just how radical the Russellian's position is. For what he commits himselt to is not merely the now obvious truth that Whether a belief is of or about an object, and, if so, what object it is about, is not an intrinsic property of the Z-state involved, but depends in part on something outside the agent, or even to the more radical and surprising truth that ' The converseof (H) does not holdbecauseagents do not generally believeall propositions which have the same truth conditions as thosewhich they do believe.Thus (B)tells only half the story about the truth conditions of oratioobliqua beliefs attributions. I am dis posed to think that tlu-otlui half of the story must depend largely on the role of belief in psychological explanation.
The content of a belief is not an intrinsic property of the Z-state involved, but depends in part on something outside the agent.6
Nor is the Russellian claiming that a belief state lacks content or is some how defective in its content if it involves a demonstrative idea without an object. Fie issaying, rather, that whatever elseit is,a Z-state satisfying this condition is not a belief state. liven though it is intrinsically indistin guishable from a beliefstate in the verysame agent and stands in the same sorts of relations as belief states to that agent's mental life and overt behavior, to the Russellian it is still not itselfa beliefstate. This is very implausible indeed. Although these considerations should make us suspicious of Russellian Thoughts, they do not yet amount to a strong argument against them. They do, however, suggest an argument which I find persuasive. Now (b) is a fairly straightforward consequence of (a) as it is meant to be understood, and (d) is clearly implied by (b) and (c). We may therefore concentrate here on the arguments for (a) and (c).
In connection with (a), I would like to stress quite firmly that I do not mean to be endorsing why Jorm of functionalism with respect to belief, but only a broad functionalism in terms of which the question of whether a state is a belief depends not only on its (normal) relations to inputs, out puts, and narrow mental states, but also on its characteristic causes and See, e.g., Tyler llurgc, 'Individualism and the Mental' in Peter A. French et al (cds.) , Stud ies in Metaphysics (University ot Minnesota Press, 1979) . effects in the world outside the agent.7 Furthermore, the functionalism I am advocating here applies only to beliefand not to mental states in gen eral. Thus the fact that, e.g., qualitative experiences are arguably not functional states does not reflect adversely on anything in this paper.
A full defense of (a) would take a very long essay on its own. I have space just to mention a couple of considerations which favor a functional ist view of belief. Firstly, the way in which we regularly talk about beliefs in ordinary discourse supports the idea that our concept of a belief is a functional concept: We know verylittle indeed about the intrinsic proper ties of beliefs in humans ami other familiar animals, and may even differ radically in our speculations as to what those properties are without this affecting our ability to talk intelligently and amicably about beliefs.
Moreover, we happily attribute beliefs to agents solely on the basis of their past and present circumstances (which arc no doubt partially responsible for their beliefs) and their linguisticand non-linguistic behav ior and behavioral dispositions (which their beliefs presumably help to explain). These points suggest that what is distinctive of a belief is not its intrinsic character but simply the sort of causal and explanatory role we attribute to it. Of course this role is a rather complex one which is very difficult to characterize in full detail. For beliefs may be appealed to to explain not only behavior and behavioral dispositions, but also desires and other beliefs which we have reason to attribute to the agent con cerned. Likewise, beliefs are caused not only by the external circum stances of the agent, but also by his sense experiences, desires, and other beliefs. However, none of this changes the fact that our application of the concept of belief depends not on the intrinsic properties which belief states happen to have, but on theiccausal and explanatory connections to other things. This could, it appears, be due to our cpistcmic limitations. For perhaps, it may be suggested, we rely on extrinsic, causal-explanatory properties in ascribing beliefs only because at present we have no access to the intrinsic properties which determine whether or not a state really is a belief. Wc must, however, reject this view since it requires that our concept of belief be analytically tied to some particular conception of the intrinsic nature of beliefstates. This isobviously not thecase. It is incompatible with the fact that the intrinsic nature of belief states is (or could be) an open, empirical question. It goes against our willingness to countenance the possibility of beings which have beliefs despite being very different from us in their intrinsic make-up. And, finally, it wrongly implies that we would in gen eral be willing to ignore extrinsic, causal-explanatory properties when ascribing beliefs if we had ready access to theintrinsic properties of belief states, whatever they may be.
The second point I want to make in support of (a) Of course none of this will persuade those who reject belief functional ism. For them I observe that my case against Russellian Thoughts would not suffer if (a) were replaced by the far weaker non-functionalist claim (a*) A state of an agent isa beliefif it is functionallyand intrinsically indistinguishable from a belief in that agent, for it is clear that a demonstrative Z-state (such as Fred's) satisfies both these conditions. And although (a*) may, as I hold, be unnecessarily weak, it is surely very difficult to dispute given the considerations I have raised in support of (a).
Ill
Wc have, then, a strong basic case against the view that demonstrative beliefs are Russellian Thoughts. To complete it wc need to sec what is wrong with the arguments presentedon behalfof the Russellian in Section I.
The direct conclusion of the first argument, to repeat, was that, if there is no object corresponding to a demonstrative idea involved in a Z-state, then that /.-state cannot be truly attributed to the agent concerned by means of a belief sentence of the form 'x believes that P' or 4x believes of y that P\ This is correct, but it does not follow that such a Z-statc is not a belief. We should expect ordinary language to provide us with a simple and efficient means ot attributing typical, everyday beliefs to people in typical, everyday situations. But a situation in which a demonstrative idea involved in a belief has no object is not at all typical, and it is therefore not surprising that more complex linguistic means arc required to attribute such a belief to an agent. But it can be done. Here arc three ways for Fred's case: (5) lied believes, as he might put it, 'That isa frog', even though his 'that' would then refer to nothing.
(6) lied has a belief involving an empty demonstrative idea to the el feet that the corresponding object is a frog.
(7) Fred believes that something which he takes to be before him is a frog. Perhaps the most significant objection to (T) goes like this: The clause in (T) which purports to give the truth-conditional content of Fred's belief is existential, and, moreover, it makes mention of Fred's demonstrative idea. But Fred's belief, it it is that, is not existential, and it is not about his demonstrative idea. Thus the relevant clause in (T)docs not representthe same state of affairs as Fred's Z-statc. So it appears that (T) cannot after all be used to specify the content of Fred's Z-state. Underlying this objec tion is a crucially important assumption which is taken for granted in the second argument for Russellian Thoughts. Thisassumption, which is very widespread in contemporary philosophy of language and philosophy of mind even though it does not otten surface explicitly, can be expressed as follows:
The only fully satisfactory way of specifying the content of an utterance or thought is by means of a sentence which (in the rel evant context i has the same content as it.
This is a natural view lor anyone who is fully committed to either the Tarski-Davidson or the possible worlds approach to philosophical semantics.
For in both cases the final specification of the content of a sentence in the object language is given by a sentence in the metalanguage which has the same content as it. And the same holds in some alternative approaches to philosophical semantics. It is therefore not at all surprising that (C) enjoys widespread tacit consent. However, the successes of approaches to semantics which conform to (C) lie largely in the region of bivalent languages or language fragments which are tree ot indexicals and empty singular terms. I think we are forced to reject (C) when we come to deal with language and thought involving indcxical and empty terms and ideas." Consider the case of the first person. We know Irom the work of Castancda and others that a first person claim such as 
